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Abstract		Data	from	the	World	Values	Survey	shows	that	generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China—trust	in	out-group	members—is	very	low,	but	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan	is	much	higher.	The	present	paper	argues	that	positive	interactions	with	out-group	members	in	the	context	of	Taiwan’s	export-oriented	economy	fostered	generalized	trust—and	so	explains	this	difference.	This	line	of	argument	provides	evidence	for	Albert	O.	Hirschman’s	doux	
commerce	thesis,	that	market	interaction	can	improve	persons	and	even	stabilize	the	social	order.	The	present	paper	defends	this	point	by	separating	two	theses	that	Hirschman	combines	under	that	label,	a	countervailing	forces	thesis	and	a	doux	commerce	thesis	narrowly	understood.	These	theses	offer	different	explanations	(or	mechanisms)	for	how	commerce	could	have	those	positive	effects.	The	data	about	Taiwanese	trust	practices	provides	evidence	for	the	latter.		
	
	Generalized	trust	is	most	often	defined	as	trust	in	unfamiliar	others	or	(equivalently)	as	out-group	trust,	and	as	such	generalized	trust	is	distinguished	from	particularized	or	personal	trust—which	is	an	attitude	toward	in-group	members	(family	members,	friends,	close	
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neighbors,	and	close	co-workers).	As	Markus	Freitag	and	Richard	Traunmueller	put	it,	for	example,	generalized	trust	is	“a	rather	abstract	attitude	toward	people	in	general,	encompassing	those	beyond	immediate	familiarity,	including	strangers	(people	one	randomly	meets	in	the	street,	fellow	citizens,	foreigners,	etc.).”1		
																																																									 1	Marcus	Freitag	and	Richard	Traunmueller,	“Spheres	of	Trust:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	The	Foundations	of	Particularised	and	Generalised	Trust,”	European	Journal	of	
Political	Research	48	(2009):	782-803,	784.	Note	that	there	are	more	fundamental	questions—and	much	disagreement—about	what	it	means	to	trust	and	about	how	to	understand	generalized	trust.	In	the	empirical	literature	on	generalized	trust,	this	disagreement	is	often	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	published	papers,	but	then	papers	quickly	move	on	to	their	data.	Researchers	do	not	have	to	specify	and	commit	to	one	or	another	conception	of	trust—and	research	projects	can	operate	with	the	intuitive	definition	of	generalized	trust	that	refers	to	the	out-group—because,	in	practice,	those	researchers	take	generalized	trust	to	be	what	is	measured	by	particular	survey	questions	(discussed	in	the	next	section).	Peter	Nannestad	notes	this	pattern;	see	his	paper,	“What	Have	We	Learned	About	Generalized	Trust,	If	Anything?,”	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science	11	(2008):	413-436,	especially	415-416.	My	paper,	“Alternative	Conceptions	of	Generalized	Trust,	and	the	Foundations	of	the	Social	Order,”	The	Journal	of	Social	Philosophy	46(4)	(2015):	463-478,	provides	a	systematic	account	of	the	different	ways	of	understanding	generalized	trust.	The	present	paper	relies	on	the	first	sense	of	generalized	trust	outlined	in	that	paper—generalized	trust	is	a	person’s	willingness	to	interact	with	and	rely	on	out-group	members,	making	themselves	vulnerable.	But,	the	survey	questions	used	in	the	research	summarized	in	the	present	paper	are	consistent	with	other	conceptualizations	of	
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	 And,	generalized	trust	so-conceived	is	widely	thought	to	be	essential	in	modern	society,	which	requires	regular	interaction	with	out-group	members	and	strangers;	generalized	trust	is	said	to	be	the	“basis	of	reciprocity,	social	connectedness,	peaceful	collective	action,	inclusiveness,	tolerance,	gender	equality,	confidence	in	institutions,	and	democracy	itself”;2	it	is	said	to	be	essential	for	economic	prosperity.3			 Data	from	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Waves	of	the	World	Values	Survey	(conducted	between	2005	and	2014,	discussed	in	the	next	section)	showed	that	Mainland	Chinese	trust	in-group	members	at	very	high	levels,	but	generalized	trust—trust	in	out-group	members—is	very	low.	Taiwan,	however,	was	noticeably	different:	the	Taiwanese	trust	strangers	and	foreigners	at	much	higher	levels	than	the	Mainland	Chinese.			 The	present	paper	argues	that	Taiwanese	trust	practices	provide	evidence	for	Albert	O.	Hirschman’s	doux	commerce	thesis—that	market	interaction	can	improve	persons’	character	and	even	stabilize	the	social	order,	a	thesis	which,	ultimately,	Hirschman	finds	in	Montesquieu’s	The	Spirit	of	the	Laws.4	This	suggestion,	that	market	interaction	can	improve																																																																																																																																																																							generalized	trust,	so	the	argument	presented	here	does	not	depend	on	that	particular	conceptualization	from	my	work.	
2	Jan	Delhey,	Kenneth	Newton,	and	Christian	Welzel,	“How	General	Is	Trust	in	‘Most	People’?	Solving	the	Radius	of	Trust	Problem,”	American	Sociological	Review	76(5)	(2011):	786-807,	787.	
3	Francis	Fukuyama,	Trust:	The	Social	Virtues	and	the	Creation	of	Prosperity	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1995).	
4	Albert	O.	Hirschman,	The	Passions	and	the	Interests:	Political	Arguments	for	
Capitalism	Before	Its	Triumph	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1977).	The	later	extension	mentioned	in	the	next	paragraph	in	the	main	text	is	Hirschman,	“Rival	
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persons	and	stabilize	the	social	order,	is	(perhaps)	counterintuitive,	but	Hirschman	shows	that	these	positive	effects	of	markets	were	widely	expected	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries,	as	more	complex	and	open	markets	developed	in	Western	European	countries.	Hirschman	looked	back	at	that	literature	because	of	the	“frequently	calamitous	political	correlates	of	economic	growth.”5	And,	despite	his	abstract,	academic	way	of	putting	the	point,	here	Hirschman	has	in	mind	his	own	experience	in	Europe	between	the	two	world	wars	and	his	own	experience	in	economic	development	in	Latin	America	during	the	1960s-1980s.		 The	present	paper	defends	this	point	by	separating	two	theses	that	Hirschman	combined	under	that	label	in	his	book,	The	Passions	and	the	Interests,	and	in	a	later	extension—a	countervailing	forces	thesis	and	a	doux	commerce	thesis	narrowly	understood.	These	theses	are	also	combined	in	Montesquieu’s	work,	but	they	offer	different	explanations	(or	mechanisms)	for	how	commerce	could	have	positive	effects	on	persons	and/or	society.	Market	interaction	and	markets	themselves	will,	of	course,	have	many	effects,	and	those	effects	will	occur	in	a	broader	political	context.	So	many,	and	conflicting,	forces—both	positive	and	negative—will	affect	persons	and	social	orders.	The	present	paper	argues	that	Hirschman	(following	Montesquieu)	identifies	two	such	mechanisms.				 The	first	section	below	summarizes	the	trust	data	from	Mainland	China	and	Taiwan.	The	second	section	provides	a	very	brief	history	of	Taiwan’s	export-oriented	economy.	The	third	section	then	argues	that	Taiwan’s	export-oriented	economy	fostered	generalized	trust,	which	is	evidence	for	the	doux	commerce	thesis	narrowly	understood.																																																																																																																																																																							Interpretations	of	Market	Society:	Civilizing,	Destructive,	or	Feeble?,”	Journal	of	Economic	
Literature	20	(December	1982):	1463-1484.		
5	Hirschman,	Passions,	3.	
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1.	Generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China	and	Taiwan		 Aggregate	national	levels	of	generalized	trust	have	been	widely	measured	using	surveys,	and	in	particular	using	a	question	developed	in	1948	for	the	First	Wave	of	the	World	Values	Survey:	“Generally	speaking,	would	you	say	that	most	people	can	be	trusted	or	that	you	can’t	be	too	careful	in	dealing	with	people?”	This	question	has	been	asked	across	a	number	of	surveys	and	there	is	longitudinal	data	at	the	national	level	going	back	to	that	first	World	Values	Survey	in	1948.	Problems	with	this	question	are	widely	noted:	if	trust	relationships	have	three	terms,	A	trusts	B	to	do	x,	the	question’s	reference	to	“most	people”	(term	B)	is	ambiguous,	and	the	content	of	the	trust	relationship—x	in	the	schematic	formulation—is	not	specified	at	all.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	problems,	results	are	consistent	across	multiple	surveys	at	the	national	level,	so	we	can	assume	that	within	countries	survey	respondents	make	the	same	assumptions	about	the	meaning	of	“most	people”	and	also	the	same	assumptions	about	the	content	of	trust,	though	perhaps	there	is	no	such	agreement	across	countries.	As	a	result,	researchers	can	study	the	relationship	between	trust	and	other	social	factors	within	countries.	And,	national	levels	of	generalized	trust	are	consistent	with	(corroborated	by)	other	measures	of	trustworthiness,	so	the	survey	results	are	plausible.	For	example,	generalized	trust	is	higher	in	countries	where	there	is	less	corruption	and	less	violent	crime;	and,	using	data	from	experiments,	generalized	trust	as	measured	on	surveys	is	higher	in	countries	where	persons	are	more	likely	to	return	a	lost	wallet	intact.	So,	the	survey	question	has	generated	useful	data,	and	empirical	work	concerns	the	individual,	social,	and	psychological	factors	that	support	
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and/or	damage	generalized	trust.6				 	Successive	surveys	consistently	showed	high	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China	(and	in	other	Confucian	countries,	though	the	focus	here	is	on	China	and	Taiwan).	For	example,	the	Third	Wave	of	the	World	Values	Survey	(1995-1999)	showed	positive	responses	to	the	survey	question	above	(about	whether	most	people	can	be	trusted)	by	50.4%	of	Chinese	respondents	and	36.9%	of	Taiwanese	compared—for	context—to	35.0%	of	Americans	and	56.6%	of	Swedes	(Sweden	is	consistently	one	of	the	highest	trust	countries).		(World	Values	Survey	data	reported	in	the	previous	paragraph	and	below	is	compiled	in	the	table	at	the	end	of	this	paper	with	the	sources	referenced	there.)	
	 The	data	showing	high	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China	is	consistent	with	characterizations	of	Chinese	society	as	collectivist	and,	in	that	way,	different	from	individualist	American	society.	But,	at	the	same	time,	the	high	levels	of	generalized	trust	reported	in	Mainland	China	and	even	the	somewhat	lower	results	from	Taiwan	conflict	with	an	assertion	made	in	Francis	Fukuyama’s	book,	Trust:	The	Social	Virtues	and	the	Creation	of	
Prosperity—namely	that	within	Chinese	culture	there	is	a	very	strong	inclination	to	trust	only	within	the	family	and	kinship	group.	According	to	Fukuyama,	personal	or	particularized	trust	is	high,	but	generalized	(out-group)	trust	is	low.	Fukuyama	quotes	a	study	of	Chinese	business	as	evidence:	“The	key	feature	would	appear	to	be	that	you	trust	your	family	absolutely,	your	friends	and	acquaintances	to	the	degree	that	mutual	dependence	has	been	established	and	face	invested	in	them.”7	But,	“With	everybody	else																																																										 6	For	background	on	the	World	Values	Survey	and	discussion	of	the	problems	with	the	survey	question,	see	Nannestad,	“Generalized	Trust.”	
7	Fukuyama,	Trust,	75.	
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you	make	no	assumptions	about	their	goodwill.	You	have	the	right	to	expect	their	politeness	and	their	following	of	the	social	proprieties,	but	beyond	that	you	must	anticipate	that,	just	as	you	are,	they	are	looking	primarily	to	their	own,	i.e.,	their	family’s,	best	interests.”8	For	Fukuyama,	this	is	a	manifestation	of	the	“Confucian	personal	ethic”—locating	the	family	as	the	most	important	social	relationship—which	is	distinct	from	“political	Confucianism,”	the	Confucian	support	for	hierarchical	social	relationships	and	clearly	defined	roles	within	that	hierarchical	system.9		
	 The	Fifth	Wave	of	the	World	Values	Survey,	conducted	2005-2009,	added	new	questions	to	study	the	conflict	between	the	earlier	survey	data	(which	showed	high	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China)	and	Fukuyama’s	suggestion	(that	generalized	trust	is	low	in	Mainland	China).	In	particular,	the	Fifth	Wave	added	six	questions	designed	by	German	sociologist	Christian	Welzel,	to	better	distinguish	in-group	from	out-group	trust:	“Could	you	tell	me	for	each,	whether	you	trust	people	from	this	group	completely,	somewhat,	not	very	much,	or	not	at	all:	your	family,	your	neighborhood,	people	you	know	personally,	people	you	meet	for	the	first	time,	people	of	another	religion,	people	of	another	nationality.”	The	subsequent	Sixth	Wave	included	these	questions,	too.	Using	responses	to	these	new	questions,	Jan	Delhey,	Kenneth	Newton,	and	Christian	Welzel	were	able	to	resolve	the	conflict.	Researchers	had	assumed	that	the	phrase	“most	people”	in	the	original	survey	question	referred	to	out-group	members,	and	so	had	assumed	that	the	question	measured	generalized	trust;	the	high	levels	of	trust	reported	in	the	older	surveys	in	Mainland	China,	including	the	Third	Wave,	therefore	conflicted	with	Fukuyama’s																																																										 8	Ibid.	
9	See	Fukuyama,	Trust,	84-85,	on	this	distinction	between	the	two	forms	of	Confucianism	and	for	Fukuyama’s	own	references.	
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claim	about	low	levels	of	generalized	(i.e.,	out-group)	trust.	But	the	data	from	the	Fifth	and	also	the	Sixth	Waves	of	the	World	Values	Survey	showed	that,	while	Mainland	Chinese	trust	in-group	members	at	very	high	levels,	out-group	trust	is	very	low:	in	the	Sixth	Wave,	only	10.9%	of	Mainland	Chinese	respondents	reported	trusting	people	they	meet	for	the	first	time	completely	or	somewhat,	and	only	8.8%	reported	trusting	people	of	another	nationality	completely	or	somewhat	(compared	to	56.9%	and	70.3%	of	Swedes	respectively).	So,	levels	of	trust	in	Mainland	China	as	measured	by	the	original	survey	question	are	very	high—Delhey	et	al.	argue—because	the	Chinese	define	“most	people”	as	referring	to	the	in-group.	And,	as	a	result,	in	Mainland	China	that	original	survey	question	didn’t	measure	out-group	trust.	Delhey	et	al.	therefore	distinguish	between	the	level	or	strength	of	trust	and	the	radius	of	trust:	even	though	trust	in	Mainland	China	is	high,	the	radius	is	very	narrow.	This	is	of	great	interest	for	the	reasons	noted	above—as	Delhey	et	al.	put	it,	“the	radius	of	trust	is	important	because	the	wider	it	is,	the	more	inclusive	the	circle	of	cooperation.”10		(This	background	material,	the	conflict	between	the	older	World	Values	Survey	data	and	Fukuyama’s	account,	and	the	later	data	used	to	resolve	the	conflict,	is	important	because	the	characterization	of	Chinese	society	as	collectivist	is	widespread—though	only	defensible	if	the	collective	unit	is	the	family.)		 Taiwan,	however,	was	noticeably	different:	Taiwanese	trust	out-group	members	at	much	higher	levels;	for	example,	according	to	data	from	the	Sixth	Wave,	41.6%	of	Taiwanese	trust	people	of	another	nationality,	compared	to	8.8%	of	Mainland	Chinese.	Given	the	shared	history	and	the	shared	cultural	heritage,	this	difference	is	surprising.	How	could	it	be	explained?																																																										 10	Delhey,	Newton,	Welzel,	“How	General	Is	Trust	in	‘Most	People’,”	787.	
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	 Empirical	work	focuses	on	four	factors	thought	to	affect	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	society:11	(i)	Civic	engagement:	participation	in	social	organizations	and	civic	activities	is	thought	to	contribute	to	higher	levels	of	generalized	trust,	because	persons	learn	to	trust	by	participating	in	those	organizations/	activities.	This	is	a	position	most	widely	associated	with	Robert	Putnam’s	work	on	social	capital.12	(ii)	Core	values	and	their	transmission	over	time:	religious	values	and	egalitarianism	support	generalized	trust.	(iii)	Institutions:	corrupt	institutions	could	destroy	trust,	and	good	governance	is	widely	said	to	correlate	with	(and	sustain)	generalized	trust.	(iv)	Ethnic	and/or	linguistic	heterogeneity:	these	factors	increase	social	distance	between	persons	and	so	are	thought	to	decrease	levels	of	generalized	trust.			 None	of	these	factors	provides	a	compelling	explanation	for	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan.	Very	briefly,	regarding	civic	engagement,	the	first	factor:	accounts	of	Taiwanese	civic	associations	suggest	that	membership	in	associations	grew	dramatically	as	the	island’s	political	system	gradually	released	control.	According	to	one	historian:	in	1972,	even	before	the	lifting	of	martial	law	in	1987,	there	were	more	than	6,000	civic	organizations	with	22,000	branches	in	Taiwan,	“ranging	from	Rotary	clubs	to	Buddhist	organizations	to	collectors	of	Chinese	snuff	bottles.”13	And	participation	in	civic	associations	in	Taiwan	grew	dramatically	after	martial	law	was	lifted.	We	lack	comparable	data	for																																																										 11	See	Nannestad,	“Generalized	Trust,”	for	an	overview	of	the	empirical	evidence	for	each	of	these.	
12	Robert	Putnam,	Bowling	Alone:	The	Collapse	and	Revival	of	American	Community	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	2000).	
13	Jay	Taylor,	The	Generalissimo’s	Son:	Chiang	Ching-Kuo	and	the	Revolutions	in	China	
and	Taiwan	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2000),	307.	
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Mainland	China,	though	we	might	expect	that	participation	in	civic	associations	is	much	lower—and	this	data	would	seem	to	fit	with	the	civic	engagement	thesis.	But	there	are	two	problems.	First,	even	if	higher	levels	of	generalized	trust	are	correlated	with	membership	in	civic	associations,	we	cannot	conclude	that	membership	in	civic	associations	explains	(causes)	the	higher	levels	of	trust;	the	causal	connection	could	move	in	the	opposite	direction,	Taiwanese	might	participate	in	civic	associations	because	they	trust	more	widely—or	the	causal	process	could	work	in	both	directions.	This	is	a	widely-noted	difficulty	with	the	civic	association	hypothesis.	And,	second,	the	correlation	is	not	consistent:	participation	in	civic	organizations	in	Japan	and	South	Korea	(82.5%	and	76.17%)	is	much	higher	compared	to	Taiwan	(36.65%),	while	out-group	trust	in	those	countries	is	lower.14			 Regarding	the	second	factor:	Confucian	values	are	thought	to	limit	generalized	trust,	so	those	values	cannot	account	for	higher	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan.			 Regarding	the	third	factor,	institutions/governance:	Taiwan	was	controlled	by	the	Japanese	from	1895	until	1945,	and	the	country	was	under	martial	law	between	1949	and	1987—so	it	would	be	difficult	to	appeal	to	a	set	of	positive	government	institutions	to	explain	levels	of	out-group	trust	in	Taiwan	(unless	generalized	trust	practices	changed	very	quickly	and	dramatically	in	a	very	short	period	of	time	after	1987,	which	seems	unlikely	because	the	process	of	building	democratic	social	and	political	institutions	was	gradual).			 Regarding	the	fourth	factor:	the	Taiwanese	data	is	in	part	striking	because	the	level	of	trust	in	those	of	another	nationality	is	particularly	high,	and	we	could	not	appeal	to	lower																																																										 14	Data	from	Ray-May	Hsung,	“Social	Capital	and	Trust:	Reflections	on	Data	from	the	East	Asia	Social	Capital	Survey,”	Taiwan	She	Hui	Xue	Kan		[Taiwan	Journal	of	Sociology]	54	(2014):	1-30	[in	Chinese].	
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social	distance	as	an	explanation	for	trust	in	foreigners—because	social	distance	is	high.	Or,	put	another	way,	we	need	a	further,	separate	account	of	the	factors	that	reduced	this	social	distance	and	made	trusting	foreigners	possible.		 The	present	paper	suggests	an	alternative	to	these	four	explanations,	namely	that	positive	interactions	with	out-group	members	in	the	context	of	Taiwan’s	export-oriented	economy	fostered	generalized	trust.	Further,	this	line	of	argument	then	provides	evidence	for	Albert	O.	Hirschman’s	doux	commerce	thesis,	mentioned	in	the	introduction.	As	background	for	these	two	points,	the	next	section	provides	a	short	overview	of	Taiwan’s	economic	history.		
2.	Taiwanese	economic	history	(very	briefly)		 In	the	period	of	growth	after	the	second	World	War,	the	Taiwanese	economy	was	very	much	dominated	by	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	(SMEs),	driven	by	entrepreneurs	(as	opposed	to	state-run/sponsored	organizations	and	state	investment),	and	focused	on	exporting	products.	Economists	Frank	S.T.	Hsiao	and	Mei-Chu	Wang	Hsiao	compiled	Taiwanese	economic	data	in	a	systematic	way	and	summarize	this	recent	history	as	follows:		“The	Taiwanese	private	SMEs	are	very	much	export-oriented.	The	public	enterprises	made	almost	no	direct	contribution	to	exports	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	Public	enterprises	and	large	private	enterprises	generally	dominated	the	production	of	non-traded	goods	[like	electricity]	and	domestic	markets,	and	are	monopolistic	or	simply	monopolize	domestic	markets.”15																																																											 15	Frank	S.T.	Hsiao	and	Mei-Chu	Wang	Hsiao,	“The	Historical	Traditions	of	Taiwanese	Small-and-Medium	Enterprises—Origins	of	Taiwanese	Capitalism,”	in	F.S.T.	
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In	contrast,	“The	vanguard	of	export	expansion	and	economic	growth	is	the	Taiwanese	SMEs,	mostly	supported	by	imports	of	intermediate	goods,	raw	materials,	or	capital	equipment	from	foreign	countries,	and	strengthened	by	technology	transfer	from	direct	foreign	investment.”16	To	give	a	sense	of	the	data:	through	the	1970s	and	1980s,	each	year	two-thirds	or	more	of	Taiwanese	exports	were	done	by	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises;	and	for	context,	in	Korea	during	the	first	half	of	the	1980s,	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	contributed	approximately	only	25	percent	of	exports.	To	pick	one	industry	and	to	emphasize	the	growth,	the	number	of	SMEs	in	the	fabricated	metal	products	industry	in	Taiwan	grew	from	1,630	in	1966	to	26,690	in	1983,	and	then	to	31,389	in	1987.17		 At	the	same	time,	however,	Hsiao	and	Hsiao	argue	that	the	roots	of	Taiwanese	capitalism—in	particular,	the	well-developed,	widespread	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	and	the	export-oriented	focus—pre-date	Japanese	control.	In	particular,	the	Taiwanese	economy	was	already	export-oriented	in	the	seventeenth	century.	The	Dutch	colonized	the	southern	part	of	Taiwan	in	1624	to	facilitate	trade	with	China,	occupying	Taiwan	until	1661.	The	Dutch	collected	commodities	and	monopolized	the	export	business,	which	was	very	profitable:	Taiwan	alone	accounted	for	25.6	percent	of	Dutch	profits	among																																																																																																																																																																							Hsiao	and	M.-C.W.	Hsiao,	Economic	Development	of	Taiwan:	Early	Experiences	and	the	Pacific	
Trade	Triangle	(New	Jersey:	World	Scientific	Publishing,	2015),	325-373,	334.	
16	Ibid.	
17	Frank	S.T.	Hsiao	and	Mei-Chu	Wang	Hsiao,	“Taiwanese	Economic	Development	and	Foreign	Trade,”	in	F.S.T.	Hsiao	and	M.-C.W.	Hsiao,	Economic	Development	of	Taiwan:	
Early	experiences	and	the	Pacific	Trade	Triangle	(New	Jersey:	World	Scientific	Publishing,	2015),	17-170,	see	the	table	at	132.	
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19	trading	outposts,	second	only	to	trade	with	Japan,	which	contributed	38.6	percent	of	profit.18			 The	Dutch	were	driven	out	of	Taiwan	in	1661	(by	Koxinga,	also	known	as	Zheng	Chenggong,	a	Ming	general	fleeing	the	new	Qing	Dynasty);	then,	in	1683,	the	Qing	Dynasty	conquered	Taiwan;	and,	over	the	next	two	centuries,	waves	of	immigrants	to	Taiwan	from	Mainland	built	trade	networks	and	an	export-oriented	economy,	with	exports	directed	to	the	Mainland.	These	immigrants	built	social	and	commercial	networks	though	religious	connections:	groups	were	united	into	hamlets,	hamlets	united	into	villages,	and	villages	into	towns,	through	shared	worship	ceremonies	associated	with	particular	temples/gods	brought	from	the	Mainland.19			 Over	those	two	centuries,	between	1683	and	1860,	Taiwan	traded	almost	exclusively	with	Mainland	China,	exporting	agricultural	products	and	importing	manufactured	products	(fabric,	cloth,	paper,	agricultural	equipment).	As	one	measure	of	the	export-orientation	of	the	economy,	23	percent	of	rice	grown	on	Taiwan	was	exported	in	1742.20	Two	Taiwanese	harbors	were	opened	to	foreign	trade	in	1860,	and	after	1860	tea	became	the	largest	export	product;	to	emphasize	(again)	the	magnitude	of	trade,	in	1895	Taiwan	exported	16	million	pounds	of	tea	to	the	United	States	and	another	four	million	pounds	to	Europe.21	Other	export	products	included	camphor	and	coal.	At	first,	after	1860,	exports	were	managed	by	foreign	trading	companies,	but	by	the	end	of	the	nineteenth																																																										 18	Hsiao	and	Hsiao,	“The	Historical	Traditions,”	339.	
19	See	Ian	A.	Skoggard,	The	Indigenous	Dynamic	in	Taiwan's	Postwar	Development:	
The	Religious	and	Historical	Roots	of	Entrepreneurship	(New	York:	N.E.	Sharp,	1996),	7ff.	
20	Ibid,	9.	
21	Hsiao	and	Hsiao,	“The	Historical	Traditions,”	341.	
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century	Taiwanese	firms	came	to	dominate	trade	itself.	As	a	result,	Taiwanese	merchants	accumulated	wealth	and	the	country	was	on	the	verge	of	a	commercial	revolution,	at	the	point	of	developing	a	genuinely	capitalist	economic	system.			 But	in	1895	the	Mainland	Chinese	Qing	government	lost	the	first	Sino-Japanese	war	and	ceded	control	of	Taiwan	to	the	Japanese.	The	Japanese	colonial	government	adopted	policies	that	limited	the	growth	of	Taiwanese	companies	and	concentrated	economic	control	in	the	hands	of	the	Japanese.	But	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	nevertheless	increased	during	the	period	of	Japanese	rule	and	export-oriented	activity	was	directed	toward	Japan	(again	with	agricultural	products	being	exported).22	After	World	War	II,	the		Kuomintang	(KMT)	government	converted	the	Japanese-owned	companies	into	public	enterprises—as	Hsiao	and	Hsiao	put	it,	non-Taiwanese	speaking	Chinese	bureaucrats	and	managers	replaced	non-Taiwanese	speaking	Japanese	capitalists.	But	already	by	1947	Taiwan	was	again	exporting	agricultural	products	to	Japan.	New	products	were	exported	in	the	1960s.			 So,	in	short,	there	was	continuous	development	in	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	across	the	three	periods	discussed	here,	prewar,	war,	and	postwar.	Hsiao	and	Hsiao:	“When	the	KMT	government	started	its	export-promotion	policy	after	the	mid-1960s,	the	Taiwanese	people	already	had	more	than	400	years	of	export	experience,	which	was	intensified	and	modernized	under	the	Japanese	colonial	regime.”23		 One	more	detailed	example:24	Taiwan	by	1980	was	the	largest	exporter	of	shoes	in	the	world,	exporting	413	million	pairs	of	shoes,	produced	by	582	factories	with	110,955																																																										 22		See	the	data	presented	in	Hsiao	and	Hsiao,	“The	Historical	Traditions,”	348-349.	
23	Ibid.,	352.	
24	From	Skoggard,	The	Indigenous	Dynamic.	
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employees,	earning	US$1.4	billion.	The	numbers	had	roughly	doubled	by	1986,	the	peak	of	Taiwanese	shoe	exports.	At	that	point,	the	average	number	of	employees	per	factory	was	134—confirming	the	small-	and	medium-sized	nature	of	Taiwanese	exports.	In	his	study	of	Taiwanese	business,	cited	above,	Skoggard	suggests	that	the	origins	of	the	shoe	industry	were	in	the	grass	hat	industry	which	began	in	central	Taiwan	in	1897.	By	1934,	that	industry	produced	15.3	million	hats,	most	of	which	were	exported.	Most	of	the	workers	were	women	earning	very	low	wages,	engaged	in	“sideline”	work—work	intended	to	supplement	low	wages	earned	in	farming.	This	example	fits	with	Hsiao	and	Hsiao’s	account	of	the	continuity	of	export-oriented	activity	by	Taiwanese	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	before	and	after	World	War	II.	Hsiao	and	Hsiao:	“The	spirit	of	massive	and	systematic	production	for	exports	in	rural	areas	was	encouraged	and	developed	by	the	Japanese	colonial	government.	Here	is	the	root	of	Taiwanese	rural	industry	and	a	source	of	the	Taiwanese	SMEs	in	the	postwar	era.”25	A	parallel	account,	describing	the	growth	of	small	food	processing	plants	in	a	small	village	in	central	Taiwan,	comparing	the	1930s	and	the	1970s,	shows	the	same	pattern	though	at	a	smaller	scale—also	without	the	involvement	of	the	KMT	government.	Instead,	the	growth	in	the	food	processing	plants	shows	“the	transformation	of	land	capital	into	industrial	capital,	the	risk-taking	venture,	the	source	of	venture	capital,	and	transfer	of	technology	in	a	small	Taiwanese	village.”26		
	
3.	Explanation	for	Taiwanese	trust	practices,	and	Hirschman’s	two	theses	
(countervailing	forces	and	doux	commerce	narrowly	understood)	
	 3.1	Explaining	out-group	trust	among	the	Taiwanese.		Freitag	and	Traunmueller																																																										 25	Hsiao	and	Hsiao,	“The	Historical	Traditions,”	360.	
26	Ibid.,	361.	
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studied	the	foundations	for	in-group	and	out-group	(generalized)	trust	using	data	from	the	German	Socio-Economic	Panel	surveys,	to	understand	the	social	effects	of	German	re-unification	after	1989.	They	argue	that	trust	is	a	product	of	both	domain-specific	experiences	and	domain-specific	psychological	predispositions.	In-group	trust	depends	on	experiences	with	friends,	neighbors,	and	relatives,	and	also	on	involvement	in	formal	networks	of	civic	engagement—both	of	which	supported	higher	levels	of	in-group	trust.	But	experiences	of	these	sorts	did	not	have	an	impact	on	out-group	trust.	Instead,	experience/interaction	with	strangers	increased	out-group	trust:	for	example,	“People	who	reported	that	they	had	previously	benefited	from	the	generosity	of	people	unknown	to	them	scored	higher	on	generalized	trust.”27	So	the	experience-based	sources	of	trust	are	particular	to	the	spheres,	they	are	domain-specific	in	that	sense.	The	same	was	true	for	dispositional	foundations:	in-group	trust	depends	on	a	sense	of	control	over	one’s	life,	while	out-group	trust	depends	on	comfort	with,	and	strategies	for	dealing	with,	risk.	And	there	was	a	positive	relationship	between	the	two	domains:	in-group	trust	had	a	significant	effect	on	out-group	trust;	Freitag	and	Traunmueller	therefore	suggest	that	in-group	trust	is	a	necessary	foundation	for	out-group	trust.	But	in-group	trust	will	only	support	out-group	trust	in	the	context	of	positive	experiences	with	strangers.28		 The	role	of	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises,	as	opposed	to	large	and/or	state-owned	ones,	and	the	export-focused	development	of	the	economy—both	outlined	in	the																																																										 27	Freitag	and	Traunmueller,	“Spheres	of	Trust,”	794.		
28	This	domain-specific	logic	is	consistent	with	the	experimental	results	reported	in	Nee	et	al.,	who	studied	the	attitudes	of	Chinese	business	executives.	See	their,	“Social	Exchange	and	Generalized	Trust	in	China,”	Working	Paper,	Department	of	Economics,	Lund	University	(2014).	Accessed	on-line	April	2016.		
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previous	section—suggest	that	interaction	(in	markets)	with	out-group	members	and	those	of	other	nationalities	was	widespread	in	Taiwan.	The	small-	and	medium-sized	businesses	themselves	were	organized	into	networks	of	suppliers	and	manufacturers,	requiring	connections	with	Taiwanese	out-group	members.	And	contact	with	foreigners	was	widespread:	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	top	500	exporters	only	controlled	12	percent	of	Taiwanese	exports—suggesting	that	many	small	export	companies	were	working	directly	with	foreign	customers.29	Travel	data	provides	additional	support	for	this	suggestion	with	respect	to	interaction	with	foreigners:	in	1980,	to	pick	one	year	as	an	example,	484,901	Taiwanese	traveled	abroad,	roughly	2.7	percent	of	the	population	and,	to	contextualize	this	number,	this	is	three	times	the	0.9	percent	of	Koreans	who	traveled	abroad	the	same	year.	(The	Korean	data	provides	for	a	good	comparison	because	both	the	Taiwanese	and	Korean	economies	were	rebuilt	after	the	second	World	War	and	produced	exceptional	economic	growth	during	that	period).	In	short,	then,	Taiwanese	contact	with	out-group	members	and	foreigners	was	widespread	and	could	have	played	the	role	suggested	here,	consistent	with	Freitag	and	Traunmueller’s	account:	experience/interaction	with	strangers	and	foreigners	in	the	context	of	export-oriented	economic	activity	increased	out-group	trust	among	the	Taiwanese.		 3.2	Hirschman’s	doux	commerce	thesis.			Economist	Albert	O.	Hirschman	distinguished	between	competing	claims	about	the	effects	of	capitalism	and	markets	on	persons	and	on	the	social	order.	One	claim,	and	the	more	widely	held	one	today,	is	that	capitalism	corrodes	traditional	social	values	and	destabilizes	social	orders;	in	that	way,	capitalism—ironically—undermines	the	moral	foundation	on	which	a	capitalist	society	itself	depends.	But	on	the	other	claim,	interaction	in	markets	can	foster	sociability,	so																																																										 29	Hsiao	and	Hsiao,	“Taiwanese	Economic	Development,”	131.	
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market	systems	“help	hold	society	together.”30	As	mentioned,	these	positive	effects	of	markets	were	widely	expected	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries.	John	Stuart	Mill	(for	example)	defended	a	position	of	this	latter	sort:	“The	economical	advantages	of	commerce	are	surpassed	in	importance	by	those	of	its	effects,	which	are	intellectual	and	moral.”31	Taiwanese	trust	practices	(as	compared	to	those	in	Mainland	China)	provide	evidence	for	Hirschman’s	(and	Mill’s)	claim	about	the	positive	effects	of	markets:	market	interaction,	and	in	particular	market	interaction	across	national	borders,	contributed	to	the	development	of	a	broader	trust	radius	among	Taiwanese.	The	remainder	of	this	section	outlines	Hirschman’s	account,	distinguishing	two	mechanisms	Hirschman	runs	together,	in	order	to	defend	Hirschman’s	account	of	the	positive	effects	of	commerce.		 According	to	Hirschman,	as	the	influence	of	the	church	declined	in	seventeenth	century	Western	Europe,	social	theorists	became	increasingly	concerned	with	the	question	of	how	to	restrain	dangerous	and	destructive	human	passions.	The	question	arises	because	religious	precepts	could	no	longer	be	relied	on	to	restrain	those	passions.	One	possibility	is	that	a	sovereign	could	coerce	individuals	and	repress	those	passions,	but	this	raised	a	further	problem	for	those	social	theorists:	what	forces	could	restrain	the	sovereign?	There	is	no	higher	or	outside	authority	to	repress	the	sovereign’s	own	dangerous	and	destructive	passions,	and	religious	precepts	had	come	to	be	seen	as	ineffective.	So	the	social	order,	it	seemed,	could	not	rely	on	repression	to	contain	dangerous	and	destructive	passions.	(Hirschman	traces	this	line	of	thought	to	St.	Augustine,	not	to	Hobbes	as	we	might	expect;32																																																										 30	Hirschman,	“Rival	Interpretations,”	1473.	
31	John	Stuart	Mill,	Principles	of	Political	Economy,	abridged	edition,	ed.	S.	Nathanson		(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	Company,	2004	[1848]),	174.	
32	Hirschman,	Passions,	31-32.	
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more	on	Hobbes	in	a	moment.)		A	second	possibility	is	that	those	passions	could	be	harnessed	rather	than	repressed;	Hirschman	finds	roots	of	this	thought	in	Vico	and	Mandeville,	though	the	details	of	how	passions	can	be	harnessed	and	transformed	is	left	unclear	until	Adam	Smith’s	
Wealth	of	Nations.		A	third	possibility,	and	the	one	that	interests	Hirschman,	is	this:	we	might	discriminate	between	the	dangerous	and	the	more	innocuous	passions,	and	then	use	the	innocuous	passions	to	oppose	and	restrain	the	dangerous	ones.	The	innocuous	passions	can	serve	as	countervailing	forces.	Hirschman	finds	aspects	of	this	view	in	Spinoza’s	work	(“An	affect	cannot	be	restrained	or	taken	away	except	by	an	affect	opposite	to,	and	stronger	than,	the	affect	to	be	restrained,”	Ethics	IV,	proposition	7)	and	also	in	Hume’s	Treatise;	Hirschman	shows,	further,	that	the	idea	of	countervailing	forces	had	become	common	in	seventeenth	century	social	thought;	and	he	identifies	applications	in	the	Federalist	Papers	in	separating	government	powers.33	On	Hirschman’s	reading,	this	is	Hobbes’s	approach:	persons	enter	into	Hobbes’s	social	contract	because	they	fear	death	and	desire	more	comfortable	lives,	these	passions	supersede	those	tied	to	domination	and	the	aggressive	pursuit	of	goods.		 New	terminology	was	introduced	to	mark	the	distinction	between	the	dangerous	and	the	innocuous	passions;	the	latter	were	referred	to	as	interests.	As	Hirschman	notes,		there	is	significant	“drift”	in	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘interests.’	When	the	term	was	introduced	into	this	context	in	the	late	sixteenth	century,	it	did	not	refer	to	material	well-being;	“rather,	it	comprised	the	totality	of	human	aspirations,	but	denoted	an	element	of	reflection	and	calculation	with	respect	to	the	manner	in	which	these	aspirations	were	to	be	
																																																									 33	Ibid.,	28-30.	
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pursued.”34	Only	later,	with	Adam	Smith,	did	the	term	come	to	refer	to	the	narrower	collection	of	economic	interests.	But,	an	important	change	takes	place	with	the	introduction	of	the	new	terminology,	even	as	the	term’s	meaning	evolves.	The	thesis—that	the	passions	associated	with	greed	could	be	used	to	oppose	and	restrain	the	passions	associated	with	ambition	and	lust	for	power—could	seem	peculiar	as	long	as	greed	has	negative	connotations.	But	when	the	pursuit	of	welfare,	the	pursuit	of	material	gain	in	particular,	and	even	the	pursuit	of	profit	are	re-categorized	as	interests	and,	further,	associated	with	rational	calculation,	then	the	negative	value—the	stigma	associated	with	greed	(the	passion)—is	in	effect	washed	away.	So,	the	interests,	understood	as	an	innocuous	and	rational	concern	with	welfare	and	material	gain,	can	serve	as	a	countervailing	force	able	to	oppose	the	more	destructive	passions.		 Taking	the	interest	in	material	gain	to	be	innocuous	could	surprise	modern	readers,	but	Hirschman	quotes	a	number	of	eighteenth	century	thinkers	on	the	point—including	Samuel	Johnson:	“There	are	few	ways	in	which	a	man	can	be	more	innocently	employed	than	in	getting	money.”35	And	even	if,	with	hindsight,	or	with	more	historical	experience,	we	resist	characterizing	the	pursuit	of	economic	self-interest	as	innocuous	(or	as	purely	innocuous),	there	is	still	a	compelling	point	here:	the	pursuit	of	self-interest	in	commercial	markets	makes	for	a	more	stable	social	order	compared	to	one	composed	of	violent	clans	or	authoritarian	sovereigns,	where	goods	are	taken	rather	than	exchanged.	This	opposing	of	the	(innocuous)	interests	to	the	(dangerous)	passions	is	Hirschman’s	central	theme,	captured	in	the	following	passage	from	Montesquieu’s	The	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	which	serves	as	the	book’s	epigraph	and	Hirschman’s	original	inspiration:	“It	is	fortunate	for	men	to	be	in																																																										 34	Ibid.,	32.	
35	Quoted	in	Ibid.,	58.	
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a	situation	where,	though	their	passions	may	prompt	them	to	be	wicked,	they	nevertheless	have	an	interest	in	not	being	so.”36				 Hirschman	notes	a	number	of	further	applications	of	(what	we	could	call)	his	countervailing	forces	thesis.	For	Montesquieu,	separating	powers	in	a	mixed	form	of	republican	government	could	prevent	the	abuse	of	unlimited	government	power	(this	is	an	application	of	the	doctrine	of	countervailing	forces	at	the	institutional	level).37	An	independent	market	system	will	also,	according	to	Montesquieu,	curb	the	abuse	of	the	sovereign’s	power;	one	of	Montesquieu’s	examples	concerns	the	use	of	the	bill	of	exchange,	which	enables	commerce	outside	of	the	control	of	the	sovereign,	preventing	the	sovereign	from	abusing	his	power	to	interfere	with	trade	and	arbitrarily	seize	wealth.	Moreover,	the	commercial	class	itself	can	serve	as	a	countervailing	force—“the	merchant,	though	he	never	overlooks	his	private	advantage,	is	accustomed	to	connect	his	own	gain	with	that	of	his	brethren”38—and,	once	unified,	the	commercial	class	will	protest	arbitrary	action	on	the	part	of	a	sovereign,	providing	a	further	countervailing	force.	Related,	Hirschman	cites	Scottish	philosopher	John	Millar,	who	argued	that	commerce	requires	regular	communication	and	builds	relationships	among	citizens—another	stabilizing	force.			 Finally,	perhaps	most	important,	commerce	creates	mutual	dependencies	between	nations	and,	as	a	result,	a	nation’s	economic	interests	can	oppose	the	passion	for	war	and																																																										 36	Hirschman,	Passions,	epigraph,	3,	and	73.	The	quote	is	from	Montesquieu,	The	
Spirit	of	the	Laws,	trans.	A.M.	Cohler,	B.C.	Miller	and	H.S.	Stone	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1989	[1748]),	389-390.	Hirschman	finds	parallel	passages	in	Sir	James	Steuart’s	Inquiry	into	the	Principles	of	Political	Economy	[1767].)	
37	See	Montesquieu,	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	155-156.	
38	See	Hirschman,	Passions,	91.	
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conquest.	The	literature	in	political	science	on	the	so-called	“capitalist	peace”	thesis	addresses	this	last	application	of	the	Hirschman/	Montesquieu	thesis	(though	that	literature	often	identifies	the	thesis	with	later	writers).	Erik	Gartzke,	in	a	widely	cited	paper,	argues	(with	reference	to	quantitative	data)	for	a	version	of	this	claim,	namely	(in	part)	that	economic	development	and	capital	market	integration	make	countries	less	likely	to	engage	in	conflict.39		
	 3.3	Hirschman’s	doux	commerce	thesis,	narrowly	understood.		There	is	a	related	but	distinct	line	of	thought	in	both	Hirschman’s	account	and	in	the	historical	material—a	doux	
commerce	thesis	distinct	from	the	countervailing	forces	one.	Hirschman	uses	the	label	‘the	
doux	commerce	thesis’	to	refer	to	these	as	a	unit,	but	they	are	important	to	separate	because	the	mechanism	involved	is	different.	So,	where	Hirschman	uses	the	label	“doux	commerce	thesis,”	the	present	paper	distinguishes	the	countervailing	forces	thesis	from	the	doux																																																											 39		See	Gartzke,	“The	Capitalist	Peace,”	American	Journal	of	Political	Science	51(1)	(2007):	166-191.	Gartzke	argues	that	these	economic	factors	account	for	lower	levels	of	militarized	conflict	among	democracies,	where	this	argument	is	presented	as	an	alternative	to	the	claim	that	democratic	governments	themselves	are	responsible	for	reducing	conflict.	There	is,	nevertheless,	disagreement	on	the	point.	For	a	brief	overview	of	the	broader	literature	see	Gerald	Schneider	and	Nils	Petter	Gleditsch,	“The	Capitalist	Peace:	The	Origins	and	Prospects	of	a	Liberal	Idea,”	International	Interactions	36	(2010):	107-114.	This	theme	has	also	been	discussed	in	the	popular	press,	connected	with	the	Donald	J.	Trump	administration’s	trade	wars;	see,	for	example,	J.	Sommer,	“Why	Trade	Disputes	Are	More	Than	a	Money	Problem,”	New	York	Times	(Sept.	23,	2018),	accessed	here:	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/business/trade-disputes-more-than-a-money-problem.html.	
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commerce	thesis	narrowly	understood	as	follows.40			 In	the	eighteenth	century,	the	material	interests	were	widely	described	as	doucer	in	French,	a	word	suggesting	calmness,	gentleness,	and	politeness,	and	denoting	socially	useful	behavior	more	generally.	Hirschman	quotes	Montesquieu	on	this	association:	“it	is	almost	a	general	rule	that	wherever	the	ways	of	man	are	gentle	[moeurs	douces]	there	is	commerce;	and	wherever	there	is	commerce,	there	the	ways	of	men	are	gentle.”41	And,	further,	the	claim	is	causal.	Montesquieu	expects	that	persons	will	be	changed	by	market	interaction,	and	this	is	different	from	the	claim	that	the	interests	will	oppose	dangerous	passions	which	themselves	still	exist.	The	causal	connection	is	emphasized	in	another	passage	Hirschman	takes	from	Montesquieu:	“Commerce…	polishes	and	softens	barbarian	ways	as	we	can	see	every	day.”42	At	more	length:	“the	spirit	of	commerce	brings	with	it	the	spirit	of	frugality,	of	economy,	of	moderation,	of	work,	of	wisdom,	of	tranquility,	of	order,	and	of	regularity.	In																																																											 40	Separating	these	two	causal	mechanisms	is	important	for	the	broader	application	of	Hirschman’s	and	Montesquieu’s	work	in	capitalist	peace	theory,	mentioned	earlier.	For	example,	Haig	Patapan	combines	the	two	theses—reading	Montesquieu	as	arguing	that,		“commerce	leads	to	more	gentle	manners	and	thereby	makes	international	relations	between	states	more	peaceful.	See	his	“Democratic	International	Relations:	Montesquieu	and	the	Theoretical	Foundations	of	Democratic	Peace	Theory,”	Australian	Journal	of	
International	Affairs	66:3	(2012),	p.	314.	But,	combining	the	two	theses	obscures	the	difference	between	one	nation	deciding	that	war	is	too	expensive	(a	matter	of	countervailing	forces)	or	that	war	is	no	longer	desirable	for	other	reasons	(doucer	desires	determine	policy).		
41	Hirschman,	Passions,	60;	Montesquieu,	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	338.	
42	Ibid.	
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this	matter,	as	long	as	this	spirit	prevails,	the	riches	it	creates	do	not	have	any	bad	effect.”43	Hirschman	finds	parallel	passages	in	a	number	of	works	from	the	eighteenth	century;	this	is	worth	emphasizing	here	because	the	expectation	can	seem	so	counterintuitive.	For	example,	Hirschman	takes	one	such	passage	from	an	eighteenth	century	technical	business	book:	“Commerce	has	a	special	character	which	distinguishes	it	from	all	other	professions.	It	affects	the	feelings	of	men	so	strongly	that	it	makes	him	who	was	proud	and	haughty	suddenly	turn	supple,	bending	and	serviceable.”44	Moreover,	“Through	commerce,	man	learns	to	deliberate,	to	be	honest,	to	acquire	manners,	to	be	prudent	and	reserved	in	both	talk	and	action.”45	The	passage	from	Mill	quoted	above	draws	on	this	tradition;	the	moral	and	intellectual	effects	of	market	interaction	are	more	important	than	the	economic	effects.		 There	are	further	questions—even	with	the	point	formulated	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	century	terminology—about	how	commerce	could	make	persons	calmer,	more	regular,	etc.;	and	about	the	exact	effects/changes	in	persons’	character	and	behavior.	The	intuitions	are	consistent	but	the	specific	formulations	of	the	thesis	vary.	The	present	paper	does	not	defend	the	doux	commerce	thesis	as	an	abstract,	general	pattern	in	human	affairs	but,	instead,	offers—as	an	example	for	consideration—Taiwanese	trust	practices	and,	by	extension,	Taiwanese	attitudes	about	strangers	and	foreigners.	This	narrower	case	captures	the	central	intuition	that	market	interaction	can	have	some	positive	effect	on	persons,	and	it	leaves	open	the	question	of	possible	further	effects	beyond	trust	attitudes.	So,	the	present	paper	does	not	claim	that	Taiwanese	business	practices	are	doucer,	or	that	commerce	will	always	make	persons	more	doucer,	or	that	commerce	will	have	the	full	range	of	effects																																																										 43	Hirschman,	Passions,	71;	Montesquieu,	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	48.	
44	Hirschman,	“Rival	Interpretations,”	1465.	
45	Ibid.	
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listed	by	Montesquieu—making	persons	more	frugal,	moderate,	wise,	and	regular.	Moreover,	as	mentioned,	commerce	will	have	many	effects,	some	positive,	some	negative;	the	goal	here	is	to	isolate	one	positive	effect	as	evidence	for	Hirschman’s	theses	understood	narrowly.		 Prior	to	the	passage	quoted	two	paragraphs	above	(about	the	general	rule),	Montesquieu	writes,	“Commerce	cures	destructive	prejudices.”46	Hirschman	doesn’t	mention	this	comment,	but	it	captures	the	central	argument	advanced	here	(and	we	should	reformulate	the	point	in	more	cautious	terms,	commerce	mitigated	destructive	prejudices).	Trust	involves	expectations	about	and	attitudes	toward	others.	47	And	the	data,	the	higher	level	of	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan,	suggests	that	market	interaction	changed	those	expectations	about	and	attitudes	toward	out-group	members,	making	generalized	trust	possible.	We	can	refer	back	to	Freitag	and	Traunmueller	for	an	explanation	of	how	this	could	happen,	namely	that	commercial	interaction	with	out-group	Taiwanese	and	foreigners—positive	interaction	of	that	sort,	even	only	in	the	minimal	sense	that	Taiwanese	were	not	exploited	for	trusting—provided	an	experiential	foundation	for	extending	trust	to	the	out-group	and	foreigners.			 The	focus	on	trust	is	important	here.	One	might	advance	a	different	argument,	taking	Taiwanese	trust	practices	to	be	evidence	for	Hirschman’s	countervailing	forces	thesis.	On	this	line	of	thought,	the	survey	data	from	Mainland	China	reflects	distrust	of	out-																																																									 46	Montesquieu,	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	338.	
47		The	place	of	expectations	in	trust	conceptualizations	is	widely	accepted	in	philosophy	and	in	the	social	sciences;	for	one	example	of	the	latter	see	Denise	M.	Rousseau,	Sim	B.	Sitkin,	Ronald	S.	Burt,	and	Colin	Camerer,	“Not	So	Different	After	All:	A	Cross-	Discipline	View	of	Trust,”	Academy	of	Management	Review	23(3)	(1998):	393-404.	
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group	members	and	of	foreigners	deeply	embedded	in	Chinese	culture	and	Chinese	society;	but,	the	economic	interests	of	the	Taiwanese	required	regular	interaction	with	Taiwanese	out-group	members	(those	outside	of	kin	groups)	and	also	with	foreigners;	and	the	Taiwanese	acted	accordingly,	their	economic	interests	superseded—countervailed—the	traditional	(and	historically	well-established)	pattern	of	out-group	distrust.	Put	more	bluntly,	one	might	think	that	economic	interests	countervailed	xenophobic	behavior	and	xenophobic	attitudes.	However,	if	those	xenophobic	passions/	prejudices	were	countervailed	but	still	present,	the	Taiwanese	would	have	developed	mechanisms	to	reduce	risk	in	market	transactions	with	out-group	members,	making	those	transactions	possible	(palatable)	despite	high	levels	of	distrust.	Instead,	the	survey	data	suggests	that	those	xenophobic	attitudes	were	changed,	regular	interaction	with	out-group	members	reduced	(in	part	“cured”)	those	xenophobic	passions/prejudices—and	this	is	the	doux	commerce	thesis	narrowly	understood.		 At	the	same	time,	in	another	passage	that	Hirschman	does	not	discuss,	Montesquieu	suggests	that	commerce	has	harmful	effects	on	persons,	by	introducing	economic	considerations	into	other	dimensions	of	human	interaction:	“We	see	that	in	countries	where	one	is	affected	only	by	the	spirit	of	commerce,	there	is	traffic	in	all	activities	and	all	moral	virtues,	the	smallest	things,	those	required	by	humanity,	are	done	or	given	for	money.”48	This	is	a	plausible	concern	and	Adam	Smith	follows	Montesquieu	here;	in	a	passage	Hirschman	taken	from	his	Lectures	Smith	writes:	“These	are	the	disadvantages	of	a	commercial	spirit.	The	minds	of	men	are	contracted,	and	rendered	incapable	of	elevation.	Education	is	despised	or,	at	least	neglected,	and	the	heroic	spirit	is	almost	utterly	
																																																									 48	Montesquieu,	Spirit	of	the	Laws,	338-389.	
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extinguished.”49	So,	to	emphasize:	the	claim	here	is	narrow.	Taiwanese	trust	practices	can	be	taken	to	be	evidence	for	Hirschman’s	doux	commerce	thesis	applied	to,	or	in	the	context	of,	out-group	relationships:	commerce	had	positive	effects	in	broadening	inter-personal	relationships.	And	this	is	consistent	with	commerce	having	other	effects,	including	negative	ones.		 Hirschman	sees	Adam	Smith’s	Wealth	of	Nations	as	a	turning	point	in	this	intellectual	history,	in	that	Smith	offers	an	economic	justification	for	the	pursuit	of	interests	in	markets	as	opposed	to	the	justifications	discussed	here—which	refer	to	the	positive	political	and	social	effects	of	markets.	And,	where	Montesquieu	saw	the	effect	of	markets	in	terms	of	countervailing	dangerous	passions,	for	Smith	in	the	Wealth	of	Nations,	the	passions	are	channeled	into	and	pursued	in	commercial	activity.	With	Smith,	the	opposition	of	the	interests	to	the	passions	is	replaced	by	the	pursuit	of	passions	in	the	market,	and	the	passions	come	to	explain	the	pursuit	of	particular	interests	(or	particular	goods)—rather	than	being	a	distinct	category	of	human	motivation	as	with	Montesquieu.	For	Hirschman	this	marks	the	end	of	the	Montesquieu-inspired	line	of	thought.	But	this	conclusion	is,	perhaps,	too	fast	as	a	matter	of	intellectual	history.	Very	briefly,	instead	we	could	take	Smith	to	have	shifted	the	thesis:	the	pursuit	of	passions	in	the	market,	or	the	possibilities	of	satisfying	those	passions	in	the	market,	is	a	countervailing	force	suppressing	the	extra-market	satisfaction	of	those	passions.	And,	we	can	similarly	re-phrase	the	doux	commerce	thesis	in	Smith-consistent	terms,	re-combining	the	two	theses	separated	here:	perhaps	over	time	this	sort	of	suppression	becomes	habitual	and	persons’	passions	are	actually	changed	as	a	result.	This	line	of	thought	would	require	more	defense,	my	point	is	only	that	Smith’s																																																										 49	Hirschman,	Passions,	106;	quoting	Adam	Smith,	Lectures	on	Justice,	Police,	Revenue	
and	Arms,	ed.	E.	Cannan	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1896	[1763]),	529.	
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work	does	not	necessarily	mark	the	end	of	the	two	theses	discussed	here	as	a	matter	of	intellectual	history.			 	
4.	Three	concluding	comments		 	
	 4.1	Ruling	out	further	alternative	explanations.		The	present	paper	uses	Taiwanese	trust	practices	as	a	case	study,	explaining	the	unexpected	difference	in	generalized	trust	between	Mainland	China	and	Taiwan:	widespread	contact	with	out-group	members	over	time	provided	a	foundation	for	higher	levels	of	out-group	trust	in	Taiwan	(meaning	that	widespread	contact	changed	Taiwanese	attitudes	toward	out-group	members).	The	causal	mechanism	identified	here,	widespread	contact	with	out-group	members,	is	consistent	with	Freitag	and	Traunmueller’s	work	on	the	causal	antecedents	of	generalized	trust.	Taiwanese	trust	practices	can	therefore	serve	as	evidence	for	one	of	the	two	theses	found	in	Hirschman’s	work:	commerce	had	positive	effects	on	the	Taiwanese	in	fostering	out-group	trust	among	individuals.	Other	potential	explanations	for	higher	levels	of	generalized	trust—civic	engagement,	core	values	and	their	transmission	over	time,	institutions,	and	ethnic/linguistic	heterogeneity—trust	were	ruled	out.		 The	argument	presented	here	assumes	that	Mainland	Chinese	trust	practices	serve	as	the	point	of	reference,	and	higher	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan	are	the	change	to	be	explained.	The	shared	Confucian	heritage	in	Taiwan	and	Mainland	China	suggests	a	common	starting	point,	but	the	explanation	might	be	reversed:	perhaps	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Taiwan	represent	the	shared	starting	point	and,	instead,	we	should	explain	the	lower	levels	of	generalized	trust	in	Mainland	China—with	reference	to	the	country’s	violent	and	tumultuous	recent	history.	Mainland	China	was	at	war	during	much	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	civil	war	as	well	as	wars	with	the	Western	powers	and	Japan.		
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	 But,	two	considerations	support	the	direction	of	argument	pursued	here.	(i)	The	introductory	section	above	referred	to	Francis	Fukuyama’s	work	on	trust,	and	the	direction	of	argument	here—out-group	trust	among	the	Mainland	Chinese	is	very	low,	higher	levels	of	such	trust	among	the	Taiwanese	is	to	be	explained—is	consistent	with	the	anthropological	and	sociological	evidence	Fukuyama	provides	about	low	levels	of	out-group	trust	in	Chinese	culture.	(ii)	The	direction	of	argument	here	is	also	consistent	with	Fei	Xiaotong’s	foundational	work	on	the	sociology	of	Chinese	society.50	Fei	describes	traditional	Chinese	society	as	composed	of	“ranked	categories	of	social	relationships”	occupying	concentric	circles	around	an	individual.	That	individual’s	responsibilities	to	persons	depend	on	the	particular	category	of	social	relationship;	this	is	Fei’s	“differential	mode	of	association.”	Outsiders	“live	on	the	margin	of	the	community”—“they	often	do	not	have	the	same	rights	as	the	residents.	They	are	not	seen	as	‘insiders’	and	cannot	be	trusted.”51	So	there	is	support	for	the	direction	of	argument	pursued	here	in	Fei’s	work.	Moreover,	given	that	Taiwanese	trust	practices	represent	the	change	to	be	explained,	the	explanation	might	be	thought	to	be	the	reverse:	a	broader	trust	radius	or,	equivalently,	higher	levels	of	out-group	trust,	made	the	growth/development	of	the	Taiwanese	economy	possible.	To	be	sure,	the	two	effects	will	be	mutually	reinforcing;	there	is	no	single	point	of	departure;	and	the	change	was	most	certainly	gradual.	But	we	can	provide	a	plausible	narrative	account	in	support	of	the	argument	presented	here:	immigrants	to	Taiwan	were	forced	to	build	social	and	trade	networks	with	other	
																																																									 50	Fei	Xiaotong,	From	the	Soil:	The	Foundations	of	Chinese	Society,	trans.	G.G.	Hamilton	and	W.	Zheng	(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1992)	[1947]).	
51	Ibid.,	124.	
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immigrants	who	were	strangers;52	this	process	began	the	change	in	trust	practices	because	the	immigrants	could	not	rely	on	their	prior	kinship	networks.	The	export-oriented	Taiwanese	economy	traces	its	roots	back	to	these	immigrants	and	their	newly	developed	trust	in	out-group	members,	which	further	evolved	as	the	Taiwanese	economy	developed—with	out-group	trust	extending	from	fellow	but	unrelated	immigrants,	to	Mainland	Chinese	and	other	trading	partners,	to	foreigners.53																																																										 52	See	Skoggard,	Indigenous	Dynamic,	and	for	a	parallel	account	in	South	Asia	see	Kenneth	Dean,	“Ritual	Revolutions:	Temple	and	Trust	Networks	Linking	Putian	and	Southeast	Asia,”	Cultural	Diversity	in	China	1	(2015):	8-26.		 53	One	reviewer	for	this	journal	suggested	another	alternative	hypothesis,	namely	that	American	geopolitical	support	for	Taiwan	after	the	Second	World	War	could	have	led	to	more	trusting	attitudes	toward	foreigners.	To	be	sure,	there	were	significant	ties	binding	the	Chinese	Nationalists	(KMT)	and	the	United	States:	many	Nationalist	officials	were	educated	in	the	United	States	in	the	first	part	of	the	twentieth	century,	including	Sun	Yat-sen	himself,	Sun’s	wife,	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	wife,	and	T.V.	Soong;	the	U.S.	actively	supported	the	Nationalists	during	the	war	with	the	Japanese,	supplying	Nationalist	forces	from	bases	in	Burma;	and	the	United	States	provided	military	protection	after	the	Nationalists	fled	to	Taiwan.	This	alternative	hypothesis	is	consistent	with	the	explanation	offered	in	the	main	text,	meaning	that	both	geopolitical	support	and	foreign	trade	could	have	changed	Taiwanese	attitudes	toward	foreigners;	so	this	alternative	does	not	have	to	be	ruled	out	to	defend	the	account	here.	But,	that	said,	four	considerations	support	emphasizing	the	account	presented	in	the	main	text.	First,	the	United	States	cut	diplomatic	ties	with	Taiwan	in	1978,	so	even	if	there	had	been	positive	attitudes	toward	Americans	prior	to	that	date,	we	would	expect	that	effect	to	reverse	dramatically.	Second,	setting	aside	that	point	about	
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	 4.2	On	related	claims	in	Diedre	McCloskey’s	work	on	bourgeois	virtues.		Deirdre	McCloskey’s	work	on	the	“bourgeois	virtues”	makes	related	claims.54		First,	McCloskey	argues	that	capitalism	depends	on	and	even	requires	a	set	of	virtues.	As	evidence	she	cites	wide-ranging	historical	and	literary	sources,	including	this	passage	from	Weber:	“Along																																																																																																																																																																							1978,	the	data	from	the	World	Values	Survey	reports	Taiwanese	attitudes	toward	strangers	and	foreigners,	not	just	Americans—so	even	if	there	were	positive	attitudes	toward	Americans	because	of	the	geopolitical	relationship,	it	might	not	result	in	positive	attitudes	toward	all	strangers	and	foreigners.	Third,	the	number	of	U.S.	military	personnel	in	Taiwan	was	small:	the	number	of	U.S.	troops	in	Taiwan	jumped	from	811	to	4,174	in	1954,	presumably	connected	to	the	Republic	of	China-U.S.	Mutual	Security	Treaty	signed		that	year;	troop	levels	peaked	at	19,000	in	1958;	and	troop	levels	fluctuated	between	4,000	and	10,000	between	that	year	and	1977	(data	reported	in	T.	Kane,	“Global	US	Troop	Deployment,	1950-2005,”	Heritage	Center	for	Data	Analysis	(2004),	accessed	at	https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005).	These	numbers	suggest	that	contact	between	U.S.	military	personnel	and	Taiwanese	would	have	been	limited	and	so	could	not	have	played	the	role	suggested	here	in	changing	trust	practices.	Fourth—and	perhaps	most	important—U.S.	government	involvement	in	Taiwan	was	overwhelmingly	driven	by	geopolitical	considerations,	involvement	in	the	Taiwanese	economic	system	was	largely	confined	to	the	areas	of	policy-making	and	investment	in	infrastructure;	so	geopolitical	factors	might	not	explain	the	attitudes	of	Taiwanese	business-men	and	-women.	
54	Deidre	McCloskey,	The	Bourgeois	Virtues:	Ethics	for	an	Age	of	Commerce	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006),	and	her	earlier	formulation	in	“Bourgeois	Virtues,”	
American	Scholar	63:2	(1994):	177-191.		
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with	clarity	of	vision	and	ability	to	act,	it	is	only	by	virtue	[note	the	word]	of	very	definite	and	highly	developed	ethical	qualities	that	it	has	been	possible	for	[an	entrepreneur	of	this	new	type]	to	command	the	indispensable	confidence	of	his	customers	and	workmen.”55		This	first	claim,	that	markets	depend	on	a	background	set	of	ethical	commitments	and	a	foundation	of	social	solidarity,	is	plausible	and	somewhat	widely	asserted,	though	much	more	remains	to	be	said	about	the	details—which	commitments,	what	kind	of	solidarity—because	there	is	evidence	to	the	contrary.	Most	notably,	the	American	economy	(measured	in	terms	of	GDP)	grew	between	1960	and	2000	even	as	levels	of	trust	have	declined	dramatically;56	economic	growth	in	China	has	been	extraordinary	despite	very	high	levels	of	corruption;	and	Robert	Axelrod	showed,	using	computer	simulations,	that	cooperation,	which	for	him	is	a	system	of	consensual	transactions,	does	not	require	trust.57			 McCloskey	also	makes	a	second,	stronger	claim	in	the	other	direction,	which	is	directly	relevant	here:	that	the	market	“supports	the	virtues”	(3),	that	capitalism	has	“improved”	our	souls	(23)—even	though	not	all	market	behavior	is	good	for	our	souls	(29).	For	example,	McCloskey	writes,	consider	behavior	at	a	local	farmers’	market:		“As	a	woman	walking	her	dog	passes	the	earliest	dealer	setting	up	his	stall,	the	woman	and	the	dealer	exchange	pleasantries	about	the	early	bird	and	the	worm.	The	two	people	are	here	enacting	a	script	of	citizenly	courtesies	and	of																																																										 55	McCloskey,	The	Bourgeois	Virtues,	3,	with	her	own	comments	in	brackets.	She	is	quoting	Max	Weber,	The	Protestant	Ethic	and	the	Spirit	of	Capitalism,	trans.	T.	Parsons	(New	York:	Scribners	1930	[1904]).	
56	See	Nannestad,	“Generalized	Trust,”	429.	
57	Robert	Axelrod,	The	Evolution	of	Cooperation	(Cambridge,	MA:	Basic	Books,	2006	revised	edition),	182.	
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encouragement	for	prudence	and	enterprise	and	good	relations	between	seller	and	buyer.	Some	hours	later	the	woman	feels	impelled	to	buy	$1.50	worth	of	tomatoes	from	him.	But	that’s	not	the	point.	The	market	was	an	occasion	for	virtue,	an	expression	of	solidarity	across	gender,	social	class,	ethnicity.”58				 This	second,	stronger	claim	is	directed	against	uncritical	opponents	of	markets,	who	assert—without	argument,	according	to	McCloskey—that	markets	corrupt	values,	fracture	communities,	and	exploit	(that,	for	example,	Western	prosperity	is	a	product	of	exploitation	of	the	developing	world).	Reformulated	outside	of	McCloskey’s	virtue	ethics,	McCloskey	claims	that	market	interaction	can	foster	ethical	behavior.	But	anecdotes	like	the	one	above	(the	woman	at	the	farmer’s	market)	are	not	compelling	as	argument.	We	might	construct	equally	plausible	anecdotes	that	show	the	opposite:	on	the	way	to	work	this	morning,	the	present	author	stopped	at	a	grocery	store	pharmacy	to	pick	up	his	Lipitor	refill;	the	cashier	located	the	medication	and	processed	the	transaction	without	saying	anything,	and	the	present	author	left	the	store	with	a	medication	invented	by	doctors,	tested	on	subjects,	manufactured	by	chemical	engineers—all	of	whom	the	present	author	has	never	met	and																																																										 58	McCloskey,	The	Bourgeois	Virtues,	4.	Note	that	McCloskey’s	earlier	(1994)	paper	puts	the	point	in	different	terms:	there	she	suggests	that	market	participants	internalize	the	required	virtue.	So,	in	her	example,	a	roofer	is	careful	with	his	work	because	he	is	concerned	with	his	reputation,	bad	work	would	hurt	his	business,	but	over	time	he	internalizes	the	virtue	associated	with	careful	work	and	honest	contracts	and,	as	a	result,	“he	would	not	put	on	a	bad	roof	even	if	he	could	get	away	with	it”	(1994:	182).	This	line	of	argument	is	not	in	the	more	systematic	book,	but	it	could	be	consistent	with	a	comment	in	the	present	paper	about	Smith,	namely	that	over	time	the	satisfaction	of	the	passions	in	the	market	could	become	habitual	and	persons’	passions	are	actually	changed	as	a	result.	
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will	never	meet.	This	market	transaction	had	no	apparent	effect,	positive	or	negative,	on	the	present	author’s	human	relationships	or	character.	If	the	present	author	was	more	patient	with	on-line	systems,	he	might	have	dispensed	with	the	stop	at	the	grocery	store	and	arranged	for	an	on-line	pharmacy	to	renew	his	prescription,	charge	his	credit	card,	and	ship	the	medicine	automatically—without	any	human	interaction.	Perhaps	McCloskey	would	respond,	suggesting	that	the	present	author	observed	the	conventions	of	the	market	in	paying	for	the	medication	and	in	that	small	way	fostered	the	ethical	foundation	on	which	markets	depend.	But	that	is	a	very	weak	sense	in	which	the	market	is,	as	McCloskey	wants	to	suggest,	an	occasion	for	virtue,	and	this	weaker	claim	does	not	yet	show	that	market	interaction	has	a	positive	effect	on	us	as	persons.		 McCloskey	herself	allows	that	a	market	operating	overwhelmingly	“through	calculation,	interest,	and	exchange”	could	not	generate	trust.59	But	she	suggests	that,	“Markets	cannot	function	effectively	outside	the	framework	of	families	and	communities	built	on	values	of	love,	obligation,	and	reciprocity,”	markets	sit	on	top	of	this	framework	and	so	are	“infused”	with	virtues	beyond	prudence—and	these	additional	factors	could	generate	trust.60	Market	interaction,	then,	on	McCloskey’s	account,	provides	opportunities	for	that	deeper	social	foundation	to	foster	virtue	and	generate	trust,	but	does	not	itself	foster	virtue	and/or	generate	trust.	This	result	is	weaker	than	the	position	McCloskey	sets	out	to	defend,	that	the	market	improves	our	souls.	But,	the	data	presented	in	the	present	paper	does	provide	evidence	for	her	stronger	claim	that	market	interaction	can	actually	further	human	relationships	and	foster	trust,	or	that	market	interaction	can	further	human	relationships	by	fostering	trust.																																																											 59	McCloskey,	The	Bourgeois	Virtues,	432.	
60	Ibid.,	432.	
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	 Moreover,	the	claim	advanced	in	the	present	paper	is	that	market	interaction	broadened	the	radius	of	trust;	broadening	the	radius	of	trust	could	be	explained	in	terms	of	existing	solidarity	or	social	relationships,	so	interaction	in	markets	is	part	of	a	causal	explanation,	markets	are	not	merely	a	space	in	which	the	existing	social	solidarity	or	already	present	human	relationships	can	be	enacted.	
4.3	Conclusion.		Reflecting	later,	Hirschman	describes	the	doux	commerce	thesis	as	having	been	“engaging,	genius,	and…	wrong.”61	But	in	the	Passions	and	the	later	extension	Hirschman	was	more	measured.	He	suggests	that	the	doux	commerce	thesis	was	eclipsed	as	the	industrial	revolution	began	to	transform	European	society	in	fundamental	ways;	because	of	the	upheaval,	the	doux	commerce	thesis	was	replaced	(among	social	theorists)	by	what	Hirschman	calls	the	self-destruction	thesis.	According	to	this	self-destruction	thesis,	market	interaction	legitimizes—and	so	encourages—acting	on	individual	self-interest,	and	narrowly	self-interested	action	can	undermine	the	social	order’s	moral	values,	and	even	undermines	the	values	on	which	capitalism	itself	rests.62	But	at	the	same	time,	the	two	theses	are	compatible:	market	interaction	could	“generate[]	feelings	of	trust,	empathy	for	others,	and	similar	doux	feelings,”	while	at	the	same	time	instrumental/	economic	reasoning	enters	into	aspects	of	life	where	it	corrodes	relationships.63	Richard	Craswell	notes	this	risk	in	the	context	of	a	broader	discussion	of	trust	and	personal	relationships:	if	persons	become	conditioned	to	make	decisions	about	their	lives	in	economic	terms,	“calculative	habits	may	become	so	‘deeply	etched’	in	our	souls	that	we	are	unable	to	set	those	habits	aside,	even																																																										 61	Hirschman,	“Social	Conflicts	as	Pillars	of	Democratic	Market	Society,”	Political	Theory	22(2)	(1994):	203-218,	212.	
62	See	Hirschman,	“Rival	Interpretations,”	1470-1474.	
63	Ibid,	1483.	
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when	we	would	like	to	do	so	in	order	to	sustain	a	loving	relationship.”64	Craswell’s	worry	is	a	modern	formulation	of	the	point	above	from	Montesquieu	(in	markets	“all	activities	and	all	moral	virtues,	the	smallest	things,	those	required	by	humanity,	are	done	or	given	for	money”).	And	Craswell’s	worry	is	part	of—it	is	an	academic	version	of—a	broad	concern	about	the	application	of	economic	reasoning	to	all	aspects	of	life,	undermining	the	possibility	of	collective	action	and	richer	human	relationships.	But	the	Taiwanese	trust	data	provides	a	case	study	that	enables	us	to	recover	the	positive	effect	of	market	interaction	even	in	the	context	of	the	widely-expressed	critique.	And	so	the	Taiwanese	trust	data	could	help	inform	our	understanding	of	the	effects	of	capitalism,	beyond	(often	reflexive)	acceptance	of	the	self-destruction	thesis.		
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Data	summary,	from	http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp			
Source:	Inglehart,	R.,	C.	Haerpfer,	A.	Moreno,	C.	Welzel,	K.	Kizilova,	J.	Diez-Medrano,	M.	Lagos,	P.	Norris,	E.	Ponarin	&	B.	Puranen	et	al.	(eds.).	2014.	World	Values	Survey:	Round	Six	-	Country-Pooled	Datafile	Version	(Madrid:	JD	Systems	Institute).	
	
	General	survey	question,	from	WVS	Wave	Three,	1995-1999,	question	V27			 China	 Taiwan	 U.S.	 Sweden	Generally	speaking,	would	you	say	that	most	people	can	be	trusted…			 50.4%	 36.9%	 35.0%	 56.6%	…or	that	you	can’t	be	too	careful	in	dealing	with	people?			 45.9%	 59.7%	 63.1%	 38.3%		 	 	 	 		General	survey	question,	from	WVS	Wave	Six,	2010-2014,	question	V24		Generally	speaking,	would	you	say	that	most	people	can	be	trusted…		 60.3%	 30.3%	 	 	…or	that	you	can’t	be	too	careful	in	dealing	with	people?			 35.2%	 67.7%	 	 		 	 	 	 		How	strongly	do	you	trust	…		sum	of	“trust	completely”	and	“trust	somewhat,”	from	WVS	Wave	Six,	2010-2014		...people	you	know	personally	[question	V104]		 71.9%	 80.5%	 90.7%	 96.9%	…people	in	your	neighborhood	[question	V103]		 78.4%	 75.3%	 72.0%	 79.4%	…	people	you	meet	for	the	first	time	[question	V105]		 10.9%	 28.5%	 35.2%	 56.9%	…people	of	another	nationality	[question	V107]		 8.8%	 41.6%	 65.7%	 70.3%	…people	of	another	religion	[question	V107]		 9.1%	 51.2%	 75.3%	 69.0%		
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Note:	According	to	the	World	Values	Survey	Wave	Six,	60.3%	of	Mainland	Chinese	say	that	“most	people”	can	be	trusted,	compared	to	only	30.3%	of	Taiwanese.	This	data	seems	to	conflict	with	the	main	point	in	the	present	paper,	and	it	is	surprising	because	the	Taiwanese	trust	at	higher	levels	on	almost	all	of	the	more	specific	questions—about	trusting	people	known	personally,	people	in	your	neighborhood,	etc.	The	gap	here	emphasizes	the	point	made	by	Delhey,	Newton,	and	Welzel,	(from	“How	General	Is	Trust	in	‘Most	People’?”),		discussed	in	the	main	text,	namely	that	the	general	question	can	be	interpreted	differently	in	different	places.	It’s	unclear	who	counts	as	“most	people”	and	we	don’t	have	gradations	(trust	completely,	trust	somewhat,	etc.).	We	could	explain	the	data	on	the	general	question	in	these	terms:	Mainland	Chinese	likely	answer	the	general	question	(about	most	people)	thinking	about	people	known	personally	(71.9%	of	Mainland	Chinese	“completely”	or	“somewhat”	trust	people	known	personally),	while	the	Taiwanese	respond	thinking	about	people	met	for	the	first	time	(only	28.5%	of	Taiwanese	trust	people	met	for	the	first	time	“completely”	or	“somewhat”).		
	
